

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN**

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SHERARD JENKINS,

Plaintiff,

-vs-

Case No. 06-C-919

SHERIFF DAVID CLARKE, JR.,  
JOSEF SABRE, KARL TUREK,  
TINA BUCHHOLZ, and DONNA KOWSKI,

Defendants.

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**ORDER**

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Plaintiff Sherard Jenkins, a Wisconsin state prisoner, lodged a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. This matter comes before the court on the plaintiff's petition to proceed *in forma pauperis*.

The plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of \$350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). If a prisoner does not have the money to pay the filing fee, he can request leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. To proceed with an action *in forma pauperis*, the prisoner must complete a petition and affidavit to proceed *in forma pauperis* and return it to the court with a certified copy of the prisoner's trust account statement showing transactions for the prior six months. The court then assesses and, when funds exist, collects from the plaintiff at the time the action is filed an initial partial filing fee of 20% of

the average monthly deposits to or the average monthly balance in the prisoner's trust account for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.

In this case, the plaintiff has filed a certified copy of his prison trust account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint. The prisoner has been assessed and paid an initial partial filing fee of \$115.83.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); *Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. Spink*, 126 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 1997). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. *Neitzke*, 490 U.S. at 327. "Malicious," although sometimes treated as a synonym for "frivolous," "is more usefully construed as intended to harass." *Lindell v. McCallum*, 352 F.3d 1107, 1109-10 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).

A complaint, or portion thereof, should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. *See Hishon v. King & Spalding*, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, *Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp.*, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. *Jenkins v. McKeithen*, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs must allege: 1) that they were deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and 2) that the deprivation was visited upon them by a person acting under color of state law. *Gomez v. Toledo*, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The court is obliged to give the plaintiff's pro se allegations, however inartfully pleaded, a liberal construction. *See Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint must include only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." This statement must simply "give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." *Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.*, 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (quoting *Conley*, 355 U.S. at 47); *see also Thomson v. Washington*, 362 F.3d 969, 970-71 (7th Cir. 2004) (no heightened pleading requirement for pro se prisoner civil rights

complaint). Of course, if a complaint pleads facts that show that a plaintiff does not have a claim, the complaint should be dismissed “without further ado.” *Thomson*, 362 F.3d at 970.

The plaintiff is incarcerated at Racine Correctional Institution. The defendants are Milwaukee County Sheriff David Clarke, Jr., Deputy Sheriffs Josef Sabre and Karl Turek, and Nurses Tina Buchholz and Donna Kowski. All defendants are sued in both their individual and official capacities.

The plaintiff alleges that the defendants sadistically and maliciously deprived him of his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when they failed to provide medical care for injuries he received in a fall. To establish liability under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must show: (1) that his medical need was objectively serious; and (2) that the official acted with deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s health or safety. *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); *Chapman v. Keltner*, 241 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 2001); *see also Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976); *Zentmyer v. Kendall County, Ill.*, 220 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2000).

The court finds that the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support a claim that his constitutional rights were violated. Specifically, he may proceed on a claim that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.

However, the complaint fails to state facts indicating defendant Sheriff Clarke’s direct, personal involvement, as required by *Gentry v. Duckworth*, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995). Nor has the plaintiff provided any facts showing that the alleged violation

of his constitutional rights occurred at Clarke's direction or with his knowledge and consent. *Id.* "Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation." *Vance v. Peters*, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996). Moreover, the doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisory liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. *See Pacelli v. DeVito*, 972 F.2d 871, 877 (7th Cir. 1992). Section 1983 does not create collective or vicarious responsibility. *Id.* Accordingly, Clarke will be dismissed from this action.

Moreover, in regard to the official capacity claims, a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is a suit against the official's office. As such, it is not different than a suit against the state itself. *Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). The plaintiff's official capacity claims against the defendants are therefore claims against the state. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for damages in federal court against unconsenting states unless Congress has exercised its power to override the immunity. *Id.* at 66. To the extent that the plaintiff seeks monetary damages, his official capacity claims must be dismissed because of Eleventh Amendment immunity and also because the state is not a person suable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. *See id.* at 66-67, 71; *see also Omosegbon v. Wells*, 335 F.3d 668, 672-73 (7th Cir. 2003) (the Eleventh Amendment bars the plaintiff's claims for money damages against officers of a state sued in their official capacities).

## ADDITIONAL MATTERS

The plaintiff has moved for the appointment of counsel. Indigent civil litigants have no absolute constitutional or statutory right to be represented by counsel in federal court. *Jackson v. County of McLean*, 953 F.2d 1070, 1071 (7th Cir. 1992); *McKeever v. Israel*, 689 F.2d 1315, 1318 (7th Cir. 1982). This court is authorized to request, but not to compel (see *Mallard v. United States District Court*, 490 U.S. 296 (1989)), an attorney to represent an indigent civil litigant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). *Jackson*, 953 F.2d at 1071; *McKeever*, 689 F.2d at 1318. However, this court has no access to funds to compensate attorneys for such representation. This court, therefore, appoints counsel under § 1915(e)(1) only in the rare case where the failure to appoint counsel would be so fundamentally unfair that the plaintiff's due process rights would be violated. *McNeil v. Lowney*, 831 F.2d 1368, 1371 (7th Cir. 1987).

The threshold requirement for appointment of counsel under § 1915(e)(1) is whether a plaintiff has made a reasonable, but unsuccessful, effort to retain counsel, or whether the plaintiff was effectively precluded from making such efforts. *Jackson*, 953 F.2d at 1073. If a plaintiff has made no effort to secure counsel, the motion must ordinarily be denied outright. *Id.* Once this initial requirement is met, the court, in exercising its discretion with regard to plaintiff's request, must address the following question: given the difficulty of the case, does this plaintiff appear to be competent to try the case himself and, if not, would the presence of counsel likely make a difference in the outcome of the case.

*See Farmer v. Haas*, 990 F.2d 319, 322 (7th Cir. 1993).

In this case, the plaintiff has not provided any indication that he has unsuccessfully attempted to obtain legal counsel on his own. The plaintiff should provide the court with the names and addresses of at least five counsel he has contacted. Moreover, the issues in this case appear at this stage to be straightforward and uncomplicated. The plaintiff has been allowed to proceed on one narrow claim that is not legally complex. Accordingly, the plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel will be denied.

The plaintiff has also filed a "motion to waive extra copies for filing complaint as required." The plaintiff states that because he is indigent he is unable at this time to have copies of the complaint made. Upon due consideration and under these circumstances, the court will grant the plaintiff's motion. However, in the future, the plaintiff is notified that if he does not have access to a copy machine, he may submit hand-written copies of documents. Accordingly, the plaintiff's motion will be granted.

**ORDER**

**IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED** that the plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Docket #2) be and hereby is **GRANTED**.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the plaintiff's motion to appoint counsel (Docket #3) be and hereby is **DENIED**.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the plaintiff's motion for order waiving the required filing of extra copies (Docket #4) be and hereby is **GRANTED**.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that Sheriff David Clarke, Jr., is dismissed from this action.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the United States Marshal shall serve a copy of the complaint, the summons, and this order upon the defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.

**IT IS ALSO ORDERED** that the defendants shall file a responsive pleading to the complaint.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections or his designee shall collect from the plaintiff's prison trust account the \$234.17 balance of the filing fee by collecting monthly payments from the plaintiff's prison trust account in an amount equal to 20% of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's trust account and forwarding payments to the clerk of the court each time the amount in the account exceeds \$10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The payments shall be clearly identified by the case name and number assigned to this action.

**IT IS ALSO ORDERED** that copies of this order be sent to the warden of the institution where the inmate is confined and to Corey F. Finkelmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, Wisconsin Department of Justice, P.O. Box 7857, Madison, Wisconsin, 53707-7857.

Plaintiff is hereby notified that he is required to send a copy of every paper or document filed with the court to the opposing parties or their attorney(s). Fed. R. Civ. P.

5(a). Plaintiff should also retain a personal copy of each document. If plaintiff does not have access to a photocopy machine, plaintiff may send out identical handwritten or typed copies of any documents. The court may disregard any papers or documents which do not indicate that a copy has been sent to each defendant or to their attorney(s).

Plaintiff is further advised that failure to make a timely submission may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute.

In addition, the parties must notify the Clerk's Office of any change of address. Failure to do so could result in orders or other information not being timely delivered, thus affecting the legal rights of the parties.

Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 20th day of October, 2006.

**SO ORDERED,**

s/ Rudolph T. Randa

**HON. RUDOLPH T. RANDA**  
**Chief Judge**